Introduction
The subject of this treatise is the question of the role of human freedom in the eschatological fulfillment. In the final and definitive encounter with God is human freedom capable of decisions which are still relevant for human salvation? First of all, I would like to present a brief sketch about the contributions of Karl Rahner God in his self-revelation in Christ "is the Last Thing of the creature. Gained, He is paradise; lost, He is hell; as demanding, He is judgment; as cleansing, He is purgatory". 3) The traditional doctrine of the eschatological "things" -final judgment, purgatory, heaven and hell -has to be understood in terms and categories of a personal relationship and qualitatively not as temporally distinct moments of the definitive encounter of the single person and the entire humankind with God. As a 1) K. Rahner, "Theologische Prinzipien der Hermeneutik eschatologischer Aussagen", in Schriften zur Theologie, Bd. IV, (Einsiedeln, 1960) , 401-428. According to Wolfhart Pannenberg K. Rahner's Essay is the most significant contribution for an anthropological foundation and interpretation of eschatological assertions; See: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, Bd.3, (Göttingen, 1993) , 583-587. 2) K. Rahner, "Theologische Prinzipien", 415. 3) Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Umrisse der Eschatologie", in Verbum Caro, Skizzen zur Theologie, Bd.1, (Einsiedeln, 1960) , 276-300, 282. ("vollendete Vollendung" 15) ): God will lead everyone in such a way that a person can find his complete perfection. A 'fulfilled fulfillment' -a complete perfection -means that, a human being in the eschatological fulfillment would be able, to realize as a free subject his love towards God and his neighbors which can give his life a completeness and definitive personal identity. This realization of a complete perfection can be connected according to Rahner with the traditional catholic doctrine of purgatory.
Purgatory as integration of the whole person into the fundamental option for God
Rahner maintains that purgatory cannot be reduced to a "payment of debt of punishment due to sin". 16) The traditional point of view that purgatory does not improve the human being is not correct. The doctrine of purgatory allows us to think about a 'development' and an improvement of human beings after -or more precisely -in or with death. According to Rahner, the catholic doctrine of purgatory not only maintains that death brings about a definitively free and matured attitude towards God. Catholic doctrine also maintains that the many dimensions of the person do not attain their perfection simultaneously, but that there is a full ripening of the individual after death which penetrates his whole personality and his whole freedom. 17) In Rahner's conception, which he develops especially in his studies on indulgence, purgatory can be conceived "as integration of all the manifold dimensions of man into the basic decision of man". (Zürich, 1973), 455-466. 21) In this article on purgatory we find not a kind of straightforward investigation on purgatory.
Rahner represents his ideas in the form of dialogue between two theologians on the subject of purgatory. Where the first theologian represents Rahners more securely established ideas the second theologian represents more an exploration of new theories on purgatory. In the following I would like to focus more on these new ideas. K. Rahner, "Fegfeuer", in Schriften zur Theologie, Bd. XIV, (Zürich, 1980) , 435-449, here: 444. 22) K. Rahners asks if the catholic doctrine of purgatory leaves space for a modified (and tempered) doctrine of reincarnation. From the catholic doctrine of purgatory one might ask if the doctrine or reincarnation which spread throughout human history contains a certain truth. See: K. Rahner, "Fegfeuer", 447-448. 23) K. Rahner, "Fegfeuer", 446. and external divine decree but rather exists as a connatural consequence of the manifold structure of human existence, then Rahner concludes: "I could imagine that it might offer opportunities and scope for a post-mortal history of freedom (post-mortale Freiheitsgeschichte) to someone who had been denied such a history in his earthly life". 24) It is Rahner's conviction that salvation occurs in a historical and dialogical situation between God's self-communication and the human being's free acceptance of God's Grace. This leads to the conclusion that eschatological fulfillment and the perfection of the person can be realized only through an enactment of human freedom. The opportunity for such an enactment of freedom in a post-mortal history is opened by purgatory. 25) Does the doctrine of purgatory also open the possibility for a post-mortal conversion, a radical change of the fundamental attitude of a person towards God? I would like to discuss this question in the following point.
Purgatory and the possibility of an eschatological conversion
It is evident that Rahner correlates the doctrine of purgatory with the concept of reincarnation only "insofar he is admitting the coherence of a personal development (and thus of decision for God) after death". 26 Human freedom according to von Balthasar is realized in dialogue with another person and with a reality, it is realized in a mutual relationship of acceptance between the 'I' and the 'Thou'. It follows that freedom necessarily has to choose whether to accept the other, the 'Thou', or to abuse the other as a means for one's God's revelation must be understand in an action which includes the human action;
God's revelation must be understood as a dramatic encounter of divine and human freedom. 39) This concept is highly significant for von Balthasar's eschatology and especially for his doctrine of a divine judgment. 40) The divine judgment according to Balthasar is the decisive aspect of the caesura into which every human being enters at the moment of death. No one will be saved (or gain salvation) without passing through God's judgment (1Cor 3,13). Judgment completes what has begun in death: there is the caesura or a hiatus between the earthly life and its goal -a fulfillment in God -"for the individual, it is death; for history the end-times; for both, the purifying and decisive judgment. Christ, the judged judge, knows our miserable and sinful identity in a personal way and thus he is able to restore the broken relationship between the sinner and God. In given to the sinner in Christ, a vision that shatters all human arrogance, it comes to a last decision: Or the sinner gives himself away into flames of God's love, who shall purify him and make the person God wants him to be, or he will hate this image offered him by Christ and remain encapsulated in his ego in a timelessness, that will be as long, as the sinners will not to surrender to God's love. 43) Does von Balthasar's conception of the judgment, intended as dramatic encounter of human and divine freedom, disclose the possibility of an eschatological conversion, a radical fundamental attitude of the human towards God? Is there a significant difference between Rahner's and von Balthasar's eschatological point of view? I want discuss this questions looking at von Balthasar's highly significant contribution to the question of a universal hope for the salvation of all human beings, which he delivers in his interpretation of Christ's descent into hell.
Christ' s descent into hell
The most crucial question in the dramatic encounter of human and divine loneliness the sinner has chosen. In this way, Balthasar maintains, the "freedom of the creature is respected but, at the end of the passion, it is overtaken (eingeholt) and grasped from below (untergriffen)." 47) The sinner's attempt to realize an absolute loneliness or a so to speak "counter-absoluteness" 48) (Gegenabsolutheit) against God has failed. In the absolute loneliness and weakness of the Son, in his abandonment by the father, God offers human freedom his infinite and absolute love.
The descent of Christ into hell establishes the Christian hope of salvation for all human beings. 49) von Balthasar does not intend to teach apokatastasis as doctrine. 50) Against the harsh criticism that his theology of the Holy Saturday would maintain a apokatastasis -von Balthasar speaks of his critics as 'infernalists' -he defends the Christian obligation to hope for the salvation of all human beings which has to be distinguished from any kind of knowledge or theological 'system' of apocatastasis-doctrine. 51) Why does the theology of Holy Saturday not lead to the doctrine of apocatastasis? von Balthasar believes: "We will not be saved against our will." 52) It is my opinion that Christ's descent into hell does not lead to the conclusion that all human beings will be saved only if it is put into the context of an eschatological relevance of human freedom: If it is true that salvation occurs in the context of the person's free will, then Christ's descent into hell has to be intended as the ultimate eschatological offer of God's grace. God would maintain his universal salvific will and the offer of his grace even at the 'place' of abandonment from God, at the 'place' of forsakenness from God. If the belief that the already has an openness and capability to accept this offer, is something that goes beyond human knowledge it still remains an object of hope. Thus, von Balthasar's theology of the Holy Saturday includes a concept of vicarious representation that does not overrule human freedom.
Christ descent into hell enables the sinner to realize his own salvation.
Open questions
Nevertheless, there are still open questions in this view of Christ's descent into hell, concerning human freedom and the definitiveness of human history in death.
Balthasar writes for example: "God gives man the capacity to make a negative choice against God that seems for man to be definitive, but which need not be taken by God as definitive. Darkness, [266] [267] [268] in the process of purification (purgatory). 55) Is there any correspondence between such expressions and the conception of judgment as a free acceptance of Christ? Balthasar tries to emphasize the redeeming work of God in his revelation and to stress the passive role of the subject in the very process of salvation, especially when he refers to the stauro-centric mystic of Adrienne von Speyr. This one-sided emphasis can lead to misunderstandings. Therefore it seems to me important to distinguish very clearly between the weakness and soteriological powerlessness of the sinner on the one hand and the role of the human being as subject and person in the dialogical mediation of salvation on the other hand, which cannot be overruled, even in his weakness as sinner. Leben, Regensburg, 1977, 168-171. 60 ) See: Medard Kehl, Eschatologie, (Würzburg, 1986) 
